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The paper tracks recent changes in the components of social protection in Latin 
America, the reforms to social insurance in the 1990s and the growth of social 
assistance in the 2000s, and assesses their effects on poverty and inequality and 
implications for welfare institutions in the region. The analysis focuses on public 
subsidies to social protection and their rebalancing. The paper concludes that the 
expansion of social assistance in the region will result in social protection institutions 
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1 Introduction 
Social protection reforms in Latin America over the last two decades can be described, 
using football terminology, as a game of two halves. The 1990s were dominated by 
reforms to social insurance funds, with a majority of countries replacing pay-as-you-go 
defined contribution schemes with individual retirement accounts and the rest relying on 
changes to the parameters of pension schemes (Mesa-Lago 2007). The 2000s have been 
dominated by the rapid expansion of antipoverty programmes, human development 
conditional income transfer programmes, non-contributory pensions, and child and 
family transfers (Barrientos and Santibañez 2009b). This study tracks the shift in policy 
focus and examines the implications for poverty and inequality, and for the future of 
social protection institutions, in the region. 
The reforms of social insurance funds in Latin America1 in the 1990s have been subject 
to detailed examination. They came part of a liberalization reform package introduced 
under structural adjustment programmes in the region. Pension reforms acquired 
flagship status as the World Bank became a strong advocate of Chilean-style individual 
retirement accounts managed by private providers. Individual retirement accounts 
chimed with several features of the liberalization orthodoxy: individual choice, an 
increasing role of the private sector, financial management, and flexible labour markets. 
In the hype, it was easy to lose sight of the fact that the core objective of the reforms 
was to reduce budget deficits and the size of the state. Looking back, it is remarkable 
that the distributional implications of the reforms attracted very little attention.  
The 2000s have been dominated by the expansion of social assistance.2 In policy terms, 
the shift in focus to social assistance makes a lot of sense. In the year 2000, one in every 
two workers in the region relied on informal employment, and only one in every four 
workers made regular contributions to a pension fund (ILO 2001). In Latin America, 
social protection has been described as truncated, because it reaches mainly groups in 
formal employment (Barrientos 2004; Fiszbein 2005). The reform of social insurance 
funds, even if successful beyond expectations, could affect at best a minority of the 
labour force and their dependants. Social insurance and social insurance reforms 
bypassed a majority of the labour force and population in the region taken as a whole. 
The expansion of social assistance is intended to reach those sectors in the population 
excluded from social insurance. Social assistance programmes contribute to fill in the 
gaps in truncated social protection systems in the region. 
From the perspective of social protection systems in the region, the focus on social 
assistance in the 2000s is of great significance. The political conditions needed to 
facilitate this shift are challenging. Social assistance was highly residual and intensely 
                                                 
1  The study focuses on 18 countries, i.e. all the South American countries (except for the Guyanas) and 
all the Central American countries. Caribbean countries are largely excluded except for the Dominican 
Republic.  
2 Social assistance comprises tax-financed programmes and policies addressing poverty and 
vulnerability; whereas social insurance includes contribution or premium based institutions providing 
coverage against life course and work related contingencies. Together with labour market policies, 
whether ‘passive’ or ‘active’, social insurance and social assistance make up social protection. Social 
protection together with programmes and policies providing basic services, health, education and 
housing for example, constitute social policy.     2
politicized.3 Direct income transfers to households in poverty had long been associated 
with short-term measures from populist incumbents aimed at aligning support before an 
election. The derogatory term asistencialismo was commonly used to describe these 
practices. Political support for social assistance was conspicuous by its absence. The 
rapid growth of social assistance programmes in Latin America signals an important 
shift within political and policy discussions. Antipoverty transfer programmes are 
widely credited with having contributed to downward trends in poverty in the region, 
maintained through the recent financial crisis, and to the reversal of rising inequality 
trends (Cornia 2010; López-Calva and Lustig 2010; World Bank 2010). Social 
protection, and especially antipoverty policy, has risen to the top of the political and 
policy agenda. Lula’s re-election in 2006 is credited by many to his success with Bolsa 
Família. It is not surprising that emerging left of centre governments in Latin America 
pay attention to poverty and inequality, given their natural support base and ideology. It 
is unusual that right of centre governments, like Fox in Mexico or Piñera in Chile, 
single out social protection as a priority area of policy and felt the need to commit 
themselves to the expansion of existing antipoverty programmes. 
The study provides an account of this policy shift, Sections 2 and 3 discuss in turn 
social insurance reforms and the expansion of social assistance, but it is particularly 
concerned with two key questions. What are the distributional implications of these 
reforms? The paper traces the implications of these changes for poverty and inequality 
in the region, and in Section 4 makes a case for focusing attention on public subsidies to 
social insurance and assistance as means of assessing the distributional effects of social 
protection systems. What does this shift in policy focus tell about the future of social 
protection systems in the region? Section 5 considers the reformed social protection 
institutions in the context of Latin America open economies and left governing 
coalitions. A final section draws out the main conclusions. 
2  Social insurance reforms in the 1990s 
A handful of Latin American countries began to implement social insurance funds in the 
1920s with other countries following suit in the second half of the century (Mesa-Lago 
1991). Social insurance funds followed the Southern European model, collecting 
contributions from workers and their employers into a fund which covered old age, 
disability pensions and, in some countries, health insurance. Over time, governments 
consolidated the various occupational funds into larger pay-as-you-go pension funds 
and used the accumulated savings. The transition from Bismarckian occupational 
contributory social insurance funds to Beveridgean state supported social insurance 
enabled governments to reward workers in the public sector and industry and sustain the 
political coalitions supporting import-substitution strategies. In Southern Cone 
countries, and especially Uruguay and Argentina, governments were able to extend 
coverage to broader sections of the labour force. The evolution of these social insurance 
schemes varied across countries in the region, but by the 1990s, most schemes had 
become heavily dependent on government support to plug in growing deficits. 
Structural adjustment programmes implemented in the region incorporated pension 
reforms as a means to stem growing public sector deficits and enhance financial and 
labour market liberalization. 
                                                 
3  Prior to the 1988 Constitution in Brazil, government responsibility for social assistance was limited to 
contributing financially to charitable institutions, often faith based (Jaccoud et al. 2009).   3
2.1  Social insurance reforms 
Following Chile’s 1981 pioneering pension reform, pension reform was implemented in 
Peru in 1993, Argentina and Colombia in 1994, Uruguay in 1996, Mexico and Bolivia 
in 1997, El Salvador in 1998, Costa Rica in 2001 and the Dominican Republic in 2003. 
Enabling legislation was approved in Venezuela but was never implemented. The 
reforms share common traits. They replaced, fully or partially, unfunded social 
insurance pension schemes with individual retirement accounts, managed by private 
providers. In the new pension environment, employees in formal employment are 
required to contribute a fraction of their earnings to a retirement account. Pension fund 
managers compete for savings, manage workers’ accounts, invest the pension fund, and 
surrender balances at retirement. They also provide disability and survivor benefits. At 
retirement, workers use their retirement account balances to make pension 
arrangements, which include purchasing an annuity from insurance providers or 
agreeing a scheduled withdrawal of the balances from their pension accounts.  
Resistance to the reforms led to diverse outcomes; see Figure 1. In Chile, Bolivia, 
Mexico, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, individual retirement plans replaced 
pay as you go pension schemes in full. Governments absorbed the liabilities associated 
with the old pension plans and the costs of the transition to the new plans. In Colombia 
and Costa Rica, defined benefit pay-as-you-go schemes and defined contribution 
individual retirement pension plans operate side by side. In Argentina, the two types of 
pension plans also operate side by side, but with a first pillar pay-as-you-go pension 
scheme. In Costa Rica and Uruguay, the two types of pension plans have each a 
dedicated pillar.4  
Brazil was included in the Figure as an example of a country which did not embark on 
structural reforms but implemented instead parametric reforms (Pinheiro 2005). 
2.2  Distributional effects of social insurance reforms 
The main objective of pension reforms was to reduce public subsidies to social 
insurance and therefore fiscal deficits. Introducing individual retirement plans with a 
direct link between contributions and benefits for individual workers raised the 
expectation that public subsidies would no longer be required (Gill et al. 2004). One 
area in which the reforms had explicit distributional implications was in the provision of 
minimum pensions. Even here, the distributional channels were minimized. Some 
countries, like Peru, did not include a minimum pension in the reformed pension plans. 
Other countries, like Chile and Argentina, included a minimum pension guarantee but 
restricted entitlements to workers with unfeasible long contribution records (20 years in 
Chile, 30 years in Argentina). Colombia was the only country to introduce a limited 
redistributive component to their minimum pension. The limited provision of minimum 
pensions meant that coverage of low income groups remained the responsibility of the 




                                                 
4  Argentina ‘nationalized’ individual retirement accounts in 2008 (Mesa-Lago 2009).    4
Figure 1: Pension reform in Latin America 
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On paper, social insurance reforms were supposed to have limited distributional effects. 
In practice, the mounting costs of the transition, the costs associated with maintaining 
deficit pay-as-you-go schemes where these remained in place, and the growing costs of 
preventing old age poverty through non-contributory pensions, all have some 
distributional effects. In fact, pension reform has resulted in rising public subsidies to 
social insurance. Chile is a good case in point. The public subsidies associated with the 
pension reform were 3.8 per cent in 1981, at the start of the reforms. They rose to 5.4 
per cent in 1990 and 6 per cent in 2000, and were predicted to remain at around 4 per 
cent in 2010 (Arenas de Mesa 2005).5 The bulk of the deficit is associated with the 
transition costs of the reforms. Public subsidies to finance non-contributory pension are 
around one tenth of the public subsidies to the supposedly private individual retirement 
accounts. The reform of social insurance in Chile did not achieve a reduction in public 
subsidies to social insurance, but the opposite.6 
   
                                                 
5  These estimates do not include an additional 1.3 per cent of GDP required to finance the pension plan 
of the military and police.  
6  In 2008 the Chilean government introduced a solidarity pension which is intended to replace the then 
existing non-contributory pension programme PASIS, and also provide partial transfers to low-income 
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DC-FF is Defined contribution – Fully funded   5
3  Social assistance expansion in the 2000s 
From the turn of the century, there has been an observable shift in the priority given to 
the extension of social assistance programmes by governments in the region. Large 
scale direct income transfer programmes focused on poor and poorest households have 
been introduced in the majority of countries in the region. The earlier programmes, 
Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Família now reach 
around a quarter of all households, while Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
reaches about 40 per cent of all households.7 Human development income transfer 
programmes have dominated attention from international policy makers, who branded 
them as conditional cash transfers or CCTs. In fact there is considerable diversity in the 
design of antipoverty transfer programmes in Latin America. There is also an expansion 
of non-contributory pension programmes in the region, a more traditional form of social 
assistance. More recently, child transfers have been reformed and extended in Uruguay 
and Argentina. Integrated antipoverty programmes like Uruguay’s PANES and Chile’s 
Chile Solidario illustrate yet a different approach (Barrientos 2010).  
3.1  Design and incidence 
A useful typology of social assistance programmes in developing countries 
distinguishes three ‘ideal types’.8  Pure income transfer programmes provide direct 
transfers in cash to households in poverty. Non-contributory pensions are a good 
example of pure income transfers. Income transfers plus services combine income 
supplements with basic service provision or utilization. Human development conditional 
transfers, for example, provide direct income transfers to participating households 
linked to service utilization conditions, especially health care, schooling and nutrition. 
Integrated antipoverty programmes provide tailored transfers and preferential access to 
services covering a range of deficits and have a focus on reducing social exclusion.9 
These three ideal types are grounded on different understandings of the underlying 
causes of poverty: poverty as lack of income; poverty as multidimensional deficits; 
poverty as multidimensional deficits and social exclusion. What all these programmes 
have in common is that they are tax-financed interventions led by public agencies and 
addressing poverty and vulnerability, i.e. social assistance. 
Large scale antipoverty programmes or social assistance have grown rapidly in all 
development regions in the last decade, especially in middle income countries. In a 
Latin American context, it is important to emphasize their focus on intergenerational 
poverty persistence (Barrientos and Santibañez 2009b). The programmes are often 
focused on households in extreme poverty, and have beneficiary selection procedures 
that take account of differences in poverty intensity. Antipoverty programmes are 
increasingly multidimensional in nature. They aim to address the cumulative effects of 
                                                 
7 Mexico’s  Progresa was first introduced in 1997/8 in selected rural areas. It was later extended 
nationwide as Oportunidades in 2003. Bolsa Escola in Brazil developed out of municipal initiatives in 
1995, which received support and financing from the federal government in 1997 before becoming a 
federal programme in 2001, and together with other direct transfer programmes combined into Bolsa 
Familia in 2003.   
8  Programme information is from the Social Assistance in Developing Countries database version 5 
(Barrientos et al. 2010). 
9  In integrated poverty programmes income transfers are not the main component.   6
deficits in income, employment, education and health care, widely perceived to be the 
main factors explaining poverty persistence. The focus on children, and on regular and 
reliable transfers, is intended to maximize the impact of the programmes on poverty 
persistence. Figure 2 notes the incidence of human development conditional transfer 
programmes in the region. Across countries in the region these programmes have a 
combined reach of 12 per cent of the population (unweighted average) in circumstances 
where the population in extreme poverty was 12.9 per cent and the population in 
poverty 32.1 per cent (ECLAC 2009).  




Source: ECLAC (2009) Social Panorama 2009. 
3.2  Low- and upper-middle-income countries 
The spread of social assistance has been slower and more difficult in lower middle 
income countries than in upper middle income countries (Barrientos and Santibañez 
2009a). Lower income countries in the region face constraints in delivery capacity and 
financing which slow down the scaling up of antipoverty programmes (Soares and 
Britto 2007). The influence of donors in the design and implementation of these 
programmes has not been universally positive. In upper middle income countries, the 
main challenge has been the institutionalization of social assistance. Often antipoverty 
programmes have been introduced as short-term interventions, akin to development 
projects, as opposed to long-term institutions tasked with the reduction, prevention and 
eventual eradication of poverty. This is an important challenge which many countries 
are addressing through the establishment of ministries of social development, separate 
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insurance institutions in the region. As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
integration of social assistance and social insurance is a particular challenge in the 
region. 
3.3  Why the growth in social assistance?  
The expansion of social assistance has been long overdue in Latin America, but its rapid 
growth in the 2000s must be explained in terms of changes in the political economy 
environment. The truncated nature of social insurance in Latin America matched the 
political coalitions which evolved from and sustained the import substitution 
industrialization development model, dominant in the post-Second World War period. 
The often unfunded, expansion of social insurance entitlements to workers in the 
burgeoning public sector and industry provided a channel through which the surpluses 
extracted from agriculture were redistributed to the emerging middle classes.10 The 
export-led growth strategies which became dominant in the 1980s undermined these 
political coalitions, for example by restructuring public sector employment and by 
dismantling the protection from international competition available to industrial sectors. 
The diversity in institutional outcomes from social insurance reforms described in 
Figure 1 reflects the strength of the political coalitions behind import substitution 
strategies in resisting change, often in the context of restricted or suspended of 
democratic processes (Kay 1999).  
The growth in social assistance has also coincided with the left turn in Latin American 
politics following the consolidation of democracy. Left of centre coalitions were 
expected to address the acute deficits in social protection which are the legacy of 
structural adjustment and dictatorship in Latin America, the deuda social. Expanding 
antipoverty programmes is an appropriate means of addressing poverty, social 
exclusion, and social cohesion—especially in a context in which governing coalitions 
find limited room to change macroeconomic or labour market policy. It is 
uncontroversial to posit a ‘natural’ affinity between left of centre governments and pro-
poor policies,11 but care must be taken not to overstate this point. In fact right of centre 
governments in Mexico (Fox), Colombia (Uribe), El Salvador (Saca), and more recently 
Chile (Piñera) have also supported antipoverty programmes. It is also the case that 
populist left of centre governments, Nicaragua (Ortega) and Venezuela (Chavez), have 
explicitly avoided making direct income transfers to households in poverty a 
cornerstone of their social protection policies. The influence of left of centre 
governments on the growth of social assistance in Latin America should not be 
overstated. 
The perceived effectiveness of flagship human development conditional transfer 
programmes has been important in aligning public and political support in Brazil and 
Mexico (Lindert and Vinscensini 2008). This comes in no small part from their social 
investment orientation in programme design. Their main objective is not mitigating 
poverty but a more ambitious upgrade in the productive capacities of younger 
generations. Poverty research has demonstrated the multidimensional nature of deficits 
                                                 
10 This point was made by Huber who noted that social protection systems expanded the most in 
countries that followed import-substitution-industrialization policies (Huber 1996). 
11 Cross-country studies on poverty find a link between left-of-centre governments and lower poverty 
rates (Birdsall et al. 2011; López-Calva and Lustig 2010; Pribble et al. 2005).   8
faced by households in extreme poverty. It has also shaped policy tools to improve 
programme effectiveness, for example techniques to rank households in poverty and to 
evaluate programme impact and effectiveness. Improvements in beneficiary selection 
and in programme evaluation have contributed to bolster credibility among policy 
makers and the general public. The fact that social assistance budgets amount to a 
fraction of one per cent of GDP has not escaped the attention of policy makers and tax-
payers. The emergent social assistance in Latin America is perceived as grounded in 
research, focused on social investment, and able to deliver poverty reduction outcomes. 
3.4  Distributional effects of social assistance 
The poverty reduction effectiveness of social assistance measures the extent to which a 
particular intervention can be attributed to a reduction in poverty among beneficiary 
households. In the context of antipoverty transfer programmes in developing countries, 
their impact on poverty is best captured by changes in the poverty gap and the poverty 
gap squared measures.  Attributing a reduction in poverty to social assistance 
interventions requires that attention is paid to economic trends and behavioural 
responses to the transfers. Antipoverty programmes operate in inauspicious 
circumstances, often against a backdrop of structural transformation. They are focused 
on groups in extreme poverty facing a range of deprivation including limited access to 
employment and basic services. The effectiveness of antipoverty programmes is 
enhanced by economic growth and investment in basic services. It is often hard to 
disentangle the influence of different factors on measured poverty.  
Figure 3 provides estimates of the poverty reduction effectiveness of Mexico’s 
Progresa (Skoufias 2005). These provide perhaps the most accurate set of figures on the 
impact of social assistance on poverty because they compare poverty among households 
similarly eligible for participation in Progresa, but where one group joined at the start 
of the programme in 1997 and another group joined two years later in 1999. The 
assessment of impact therefore controls for environmental trends as well as behavioural 
responses. Using as a poverty line the 50th percentile of household consumption, 
Skoufias (2005) finds that Progresa had a very limited impact on the headcount poverty 
headcount rate, with a further 11.7 per cent of beneficiaries reaching the poverty line; 
but a stronger impact on the poverty gap and the poverty gap square. Progresa reduced 
the poverty gap among beneficiaries by more than one third compared to eligible but not 
yet participating individuals. It reduced the poverty gap squared by just over 45 per 
cent. These estimates confirm that Progresa had a stronger impact among the poorest 
beneficiaries.  
Surprisingly, much less is known about the impact of social assistance on poverty than 
about its impact on inequality.12 The impact of antipoverty programmes on inequality 
has been scrutinized closely in Brazil, where the longstanding rising trend in inequality 
appeared to have turned sharply about the turn of the century just when antipoverty 
programmes were being scaled up. Several studies have come to the conclusion that 
                                                 
12 ECLAC estimated the contribution to inequality of different types of transfers with household survey 
data circa 2008 for 18 Latin American countries (ECLAC 2009). Unfortunately, ECLAC lumped 
together social assistance with private transfers from civil society organizations and included non-
contributory pensions as pension income, separate from social assistance. Their conclusion is that 
social assistance transfers, thus computed, have a very marginal but positive effect on inequality.   9
Bolsa Família has made an important contribution to the reduction of inequality in 
Brazil (Barros et al. 2007; Soares et al. 2006; Soares et al. 2010; Soares et al. 2007).13  
 





Notes: Poverty line is 50th percentile of per capita household consumption. Difference in 
difference (Dif2) is calculated by subtracting the change in measured poverty of the treated 
group from the change in the control group. % change is calculated as: Dif2/measured poverty 
of the treatment group in 1997. 
 
Source: Skoufias (2005). 
 
The identification of the impact of Bolsa Família on inequality relies on factorial 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient into the contribution of the different income 
sources. Denoting G for the Gini; Ck for the concentration coefficients of income source 
k; and w for the weight of each source in total income; the Gini of per capita household 
income is decomposed dynamically as (with the caps indicating the initial observation): 
(1)     =	∑      ∆   +	  ̅  −	 ̅       					 
Table 1 summarizes data on Bolsa Família and on its effects on inequality reported in 
Soares et al. (2010). The contributions of two sources of income linked to social 
                                                 
13 Soares et al. (2007) extend this analysis to the impact of human development conditional transfer 
programmes in Mexico and Chile on inequality and find they had contributed to the fall in inequality 
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assistance are reported in the table: basic pension income and Bolsa Família transfers. In 
the Brazilian social protection system, Beneficio de Prestaçāo Continuada is a non-
contributory pension scheme for older and disabled people living in households in 
extreme poverty; Prêvidencia Social Rural is another non-contributory pension 
programme providing transfers to workers in informal employment in agriculture 
mining and fishing. They provide a pension equivalent to one minimum wage. Workers 
affiliated to contributory social insurance who fail to accumulate enough contributions 
at retirement also receive a minimum guaranteed pension of one minimum wage, which 
makes it difficult to identify these two groups with precision in the survey data. 
Reported pension income at one minimum wage in value covers all these types of 
transfers. The other income source selected is Bolsa Família transfers, although in 
practice this includes reported income from all direct transfer programmes. The 
decomposition indicated above finds that these two sources of income associated with 
social assistance appear to be responsible for 15 and 16 per cent respectively of the 
overall decline in the Gini in the period 1999-2009 (Soares et al. 2010). Social 
assistance transfers would have contributed around one third of the reduction in the Gini 
in Brazil over a decade. 
Table 1: Estimated impact of Bolsa Família on Inequality (monetary values in R$2009; all 
figures estimated from PNAD) 
 2001 2003 2005 2007  2009 
Bolsa Família data from PNAD    
Beneficiaries millions  9.7 27. 4 31 33.1  41.2 
% population  5.8 16 17.2 18.1  22.2 
Beneficiaries mean income R$  336 222 225 219  233 
Beneficiaries mean income less transfer 
R$ 
328 212 211 202 212 
Mean transfer R$  8 10 15 19  21 
% of beneficiary income  2.5 4.7 6.5 8.8  9.5 
    
Impact on inequality  1999-01 2001-03 2003-05 2005-07 2007-9 
Change in Gini attributed to basic pension 
income = MW  
0.094 -0.387 -0.126 -0.236 -0.123 
Change in Gini attributed to BF transfers  -0.081 -0.208 -0.116 -0.106  -0.212 
Change in overall Gini  0.181 -1.228 -1.386 -1.35  -1.384 
 
Data source: (Soares et al. 2010). 
Some caution must be exercised in interpreting these figures. The Bolsa Família budget 
stands at around 0.4 per cent of GDP, while the combined budgets of the non-
contributory pension schemes are around 1.8 per cent of GDP, see Figure 3. The results 
above suggest that spending 0.4 per cent of GDP on Bolsa Família could have the effect 
of reducing the Gini by just less than one point. Soares et al. (2010) attribute the 
effectiveness of Bolsa Família in reducing inequality to the fact that it reaches 
extremely poor households. There are issues with data and methodology which need to 
be considered. The PNAD household surveys does not allow a direct identification of 
Bolsa Família beneficiaries, so identification is made by examining the amounts 
reported by potential beneficiaries, an approach widely agreed to be imperfect.14 The 
                                                 
14 Soares et al. (2010) provide a detailed discussion of data and methodological issues.   11
impact on inequality from the introduction of an antipoverty transfer programme is 
likely to be a one-off change. It is intriguing to see from the Table that Bolsa Família 
appears to have a cumulative effect on the Gini. This might have arisen from the 
expansion of Bolsa Família beneficiaries and/or from increases in the value of the 
transfers. The Table provides some confirmation of these; but concerns remain about 
the size of the changes in beneficiary numbers and in the value of transfers compared to 
the size of the effects on the Gini.15 The factorial redistribution considers only the 
contribution of changes in income sources on inequality, but it is important to take on 
board the changes in policy which are responsible for the changes in income sources in 
the first place. In the case of Brazil, minimum wages are a fundamental policy lever 
because they set the value of social assistance benefits apart from Bolsa Família, but 
they are also a benchmark for informal workers’ wage setting. During Lula’s two 
administrations the minimum wage increased in real terms by over 50 per cent. This 
policy change had a impact on both labour earnings of low income workers, non-
contributory pension benefits, and indirectly on Bolsa Família (Saboia 2009). Changes 
in labour earnings remain the single most important influence on inequality in Brazil, 
accounting for 59 per cent of the reduction in the Gini 1999-2009. As noted above the 
impact of pension benefits where the benefit is equivalent to a minimum wage 
accounted for a further 15 per cent of the fall in the Gini. The influence of the minimum 
wage on the decline in inequality is likely to be primal. Another issue recommending 
caution is that the estimation and decomposition of the Gini does not take account of the 
distributional impact of raising the revenue to finance social assistance. The implicit 
assumption is that fiscal revenues have no distributional effects. A more comprehensive 
perspective on this would require examining the combined effects of taxes and transfers. 
The handful of studies on this issue in Brazil suggest that the tax-transfer system 
generates very little redistribution (Immervoll et al. 2006; Silveira 2008). 
4  Rebalancing public subsidies to social insurance and assistance 
A productive way to bring together the discussion on the distributional effects of social 
insurance reforms and the growth of social assistance and link it to policy is to focus on 
the balance of public subsidies to social protection in Latin America. This approach 
acknowledges that in practice social insurance schemes in Latin America, whether 
‘public’ pension schemes or ‘private’ individual retirement plans, absorb a significant 
amount of public subsidies. Social assistance, on the other hand is wholly financed 
through public subsidies. The point is to fix attention on the allocation of public 
subsidies. The expansion in social assistance in the region will inevitably involve a 
rebalancing of public subsidies to social insurance and social assistance. 
The analysis above concluded that because the reach of social insurance is restricted to 
workers in formal employment, public subsidies to social insurance will have a limited 
impact on poverty and, depending on the revenue mix, adverse effects on inequality. 
The analysis of the distributional effects of social assistance, on the other hand, 
suggested that its impact on poverty is significant, but its impact on the distribution of 
income is limited. This is in line with the findings from an emerging literature studying 
the distributional effects of taxes and transfers in the region (De Castro et al. 2008; Scott 
                                                 
15 An alternative explanation is that antipoverty transfers might have more than proportionate effects on 
the productive capacity of households, and that these effects unfold over time (Barrientos, in press). 
This would be the case if transfers help beneficiaries overcome poverty traps, for example.   12
2005; Skoufias et al. 2010). A rebalancing of public subsidies from social insurance to 
social assistance is bound to be welfare improving.  
It is illustrative to consider the current situation in Brazil. Figure 3 shows the financing 
requirements as a proportion of GDP of the different components of the social 
protection system in Brazil in 2008.  
The distribution of public subsidies within social protection is highly regressive. They 
include highly generous pension entitlements to civil servants to the tune of 2.35 per 
cent of GDP (Pinheiro 2005). The urban component of the private sector social 
insurance fund is close to break-even point, but there is considerable inequality in the 
distribution of entitlements within the fund. A majority of social insurance pensioners 
only manage to qualify for the minimum guarantee pension benefit equivalent to one 
minimum wage (Schwarzer and Querino 2002). The rural component which includes 
Prêvidencia Social Rural, a programme aimed at extending social insurance entitlements 
to workers in informal employment had a deficit of 1.29 per cent of GDP in 2008. The 
rural component of the private social insurance fund is best understood as non-
contributory or partially-contributory. The two explicit social assistance components, 
Bolsa Família and the Beneficio de Prestaçao Continuada absorb just less than 1 per 
cent of GDP. Public subsidies are marginally tilted towards social insurance, but public 
subsidies per beneficiary are heavily biased towards privileged civil servants. As much 
as 2.35 per cent of GDP in public subsidies go to less than 1 million civil servants, 
while 0.38 per cent of GDP is shared by over 12 million Bolsa Família beneficiary 
households.  
Consideration of the distributional effects of public subsidies to social insurance and 
social assistance would recommend a rebalancing away from social insurance and 
towards social assistance, as a means of maximizing the welfare effects of public 
transfers. In fact, the expansion of social assistance in the region in the 2000s indicates 
that this rebalancing is underway (Barrientos 2009). It is an explicit objective of 
government policy in several countries in the region, including Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina (De Castro et al. 2008; Scott 2005). The rebalancing has been facilitated by a 
context of growth and rising fiscal revenues. The fact that social assistance programmes 
absorb a very small proportion of GDP has largely kept these changes at a low key. The 
substantial public subsidies to social insurance suggest that the scope for re-balancing 
these subsidies is large in upper middle income countries in the region (Barreix et al. 
2007; Breceda et al. 2009; Cubero and Vladkova Hollar 2010; Goñi et al. 2008). 
5  Options for the future of social protection in open economies 
5.1  Growing social insurance? 
Social insurance schemes in the region have consolidated after the bout of reforms in 
the 1990s.16 Argentina’s ‘nationalization’ of private pension funds in 2008 appears to 
indicate a different trend, but there are conflictive views on the motivation and 
sustainability of the changes. Individual retirement plans have emerged from the 2008 
financial crisis with slightly fewer contributors, but the swift recovery has contributed to 
                                                 
16 This is not to ignore subsequent reforms to individual retirement plans in some countries (Bertranou et 
al. 2009).   13
minimize the financial impact (Marcel and Tapia 2010). Trends in the density of 
contributions among workers affiliated to individual retirement accounts will need to be 
closely scrutinized in the future as they provide clues on the extent to which these plans 
will provide satisfactory levels of retirement income for current contributors.  
There are few indications that, absent growing public subsidies, social insurance 
institutions in the region are capable of reaching groups currently excluded. Efforts to 
‘grow’ social insurance have been heavily dependent on the government support. 
Brazil’s  Prêvidencia Social Rural represents an important attempt to incorporate 
informal workers in rural areas within social insurance institutions. The strategy adopted 
was to adjust the requisites for entitlement to take account of the specific nature of rural 
employment. A lower contributory requirement of 10 years was granted to informal 
workers, and its implementation was suspended for ten years to provide incentives for 
workers to join and start contributing. In practice, the contributory requirement was 
never introduced, and the benefits are financed largely through government subsidies. 
Chile’s introduction of the Pilar Solidario in 2008 provides a guaranteed floor to 
pension income, through a mix of non-contributory benefits and subsidies to 
contributory benefits. Argentina’s Plan de Inclusion Previsional effectively lowered the 
conditions for accessing benefits for self-employed workers and other workers excluded 
from social insurance. Uruguay’s and Argentina’s child subsidy programmes fill in the 
gaps in pre-existing child subsidy programmes restricted to workers in social insurance 
funds and tax credits for high income groups.  
There is some common ground in these examples. They are limited to upper middle 
income countries with relatively high social insurance coverage (in the context of Latin 
America). They are all financed in full from public revenues. There are no cross-
subsidies from social insurance contributors. They were all explicitly developed and 
implemented as a response to the perceived deficiencies of social insurance schemes, 
and as a means to sustain them. Are they a case of governments trying to find effective 
ways of supporting the inclusion of low income and vulnerable workers within social 
insurance? Or are they a case of public funds being employed to cover social 
insurance’s ‘bad risks’? The absence of cross-subsidies from social insurance suggests 
that the latter interpretation might be closer to the truth.  
5.2  Social protection after the growth of social assistance 
There are strong arguments supporting the view that social protection systems in the 
region have been strengthened by the growth of social assistance in the last decade. 
Social assistance helps to extend social protection coverage to sections of the population 
traditionally excluded from social insurance institutions, and is effective in reducing 
extreme and persistent poverty. It also has the potential to improve human development 
and economic inclusion among low income groups. Social assistance absorbs a very 
small fraction of public revenues, and there is every prospect that social assistance 
budgets will reduce in the future as poverty reduces. The growth in social assistance is a 
welcomed development because it fills in a missing component from social protection 
systems in the region. 
On the other side of the balance sheet, social assistance is effective in reducing poverty 
only as part of a successful development strategy which includes economic growth and 
the provision of basic services. Antipoverty programmes of the type currently in place    14
Figure 4: Brazil's social protection: financing requirement and transfers 2008/9 
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How will this situation evolve in the future? Current research and policy discussions 
have not lead to a settled view on this issue. The emerging orthodoxy argues for a 
stronger integration of social insurance and social assistance, and an urgent upgrade of 
labour market policies (CEPAL 2006; Ferreira and Robalino 2010; Levy 2008; Ribe et 
al. 2010). The outlook is different for lower and upper middle income countries in the 
region. In middle income countries the conditions for integrating well developed and 
longstanding social insurance institutions with emerging social assistance are hugely 
complex.17 In lower middle income countries, with underdeveloped and weak social 
insurance institutions, the expansion of social assistance as opposed to integration with 
social insurance is the urgent challenge for the medium term.  
6 Conclusions 
The main objective of this study was to trace the changes in social protection systems in 
the region and assess their distributional implications. It revisited the social insurance 
reforms of the 1990s, and the expansion of social assistance in the 2000s, discussing 
their implications for poverty and inequality and for the future of social protection in the 
region. 
The development of social protection systems in the region relied upon social insurance 
as its main component, and paid very little attention to social assistance. At the turn of 
the century, social protection systems in Latin America could be described as truncated. 
The reforms of social insurance in the 1990s were supposed to reduce fiscal deficits and 
expand coverage, but managed neither of these two goals. The expansion of social 
assistance in the 2000s has contributed to fill in this gap. Large scale antipoverty 
programmes in upper middle income countries in the region provide a basic form of 
social protection to groups previously excluded from social insurance. In lower middle 
income countries, the expansion of social assistance has been more tentative and limited 
in scope. Social assistance is now a significant component of social protection in the 
region. 
What are the distributional effects of these changes? The paper focused on the 
allocation of public subsidies to social insurance and assistance. In the context of Latin 
America, public subsidies to social insurance make a very small contribution to poverty 
reduction, and the impact on inequality is in the main regressive. Social assistance can 
be effective in reducing poverty, particularly where programmes prioritize the 
population in extreme poverty; but the size of the transfers relative to household income 
limits their impact on the poverty headcount rate. There is some evidence that social 
assistance can have a small, positive, impact on inequality. 
It follows that a rebalancing of public subsidies away from social insurance and towards 
social assistance has the potential to improve welfare. The growth of social assistance 
shows this rebalancing is underway. The size of public subsidies to social insurance 
suggests the scope for this rebalancing is significant. Economic growth and an enhanced 
fiscal space have facilitated this rebalancing in the last decade. 
                                                 
17 This is a classic case of balancing the demands from welfarist approaches on the design and 
implementation of tax and transfer schemes with the demands from non-welfarist poverty eradication 
objectives (Akerlof 1978; Feldstein 1987).   16
Have the changes in social protection been associated with the spread of left of centre 
governments? The social insurance reforms of the 1990s were part of a liberalization 
project, in many cases pushed through exceptional political conditions. The expansion 
of social assistance in the 2000s coincided with a shift in the region of the political 
centre of gravity to the left. However, but both left- and right-of-centre governments 
have supported it. The influence of left of centre political coalitions was associated with 
a rapid scaling up of social assistance. More generally, there is a stronger link between 
democratization and the expansion of social assistance, regardless of the politics of 
ruling parties.18 
Do these changes fit in with Latin America’s open economies? There is little doubt that 
the stagnation of social insurance funds in Latin America is associated with the changes 
in the employment relationship brought about by the new conditions in liberalized 
labour markets. Social insurance works best for workers in long-term and stable 
employment. Multidimensional social assistance programmes are on paper better able to 
address ‘new’ vulnerabilities associated with irregular employment, and periods of low 
earnings and unemployment. Social assistance is better able to provide a floor to 
household consumption and investment in human development. In this sense, social 
assistance provides a better ‘fit’ with conditions in open economies with liberalized 
labour markets.  
What do these changes tell us about the future of social protection in the region? There 
is little doubt that the growth in social assistance signals a reconfiguration of social 
protection systems in the region. The growing institutionalization of social assistance is 
a welcomed step forward in the transition towards comprehensive social protection 
systems in the region. The impact of the recent financial crisis on the economies of 
Latin America has underlined the urgency attached to developing and strengthening 
active labour market policies. There remains uncertainty over the evolution of the 
linkages between social insurance and social assistance. Innovative policies will be 
needed to progress on a greater integration of social insurance and assistance; but in 
lower middle income countries the expansion of social assistance constitutes a more 
urgent challenge.         
 
   
                                                 
18 Birdsall et al. (2011) draw a distinction between social democratic and populist left regimes, with 
most Central America and Andean countries falling in the latter group. Their analysis concludes that 
redistribution is less effective and sustainable in these countries.    17
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